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Over the next thirty years, the percentage of people who are 65 and over will grow rapidly while
the percentage of people in their working years will decline. This shift in the age distribution
of the population will put enormous pressure on social security systems in the United States,
Germany, and Japan as the number of workers whose payroll taxes fund each retiree drops sharply.
The demographic profile of the United States will change
dramatically in the coming decades. The combination of
lower birth rates and longer life spans will swell the ranks
of people aged 65 and over from 12 percent of the popula-
tion today to 20 percent, or one out of every five people,
by 2030. The shift to an older population is not unique to
the United States, however: this phenomenon is projected
to be global in nature. Indeed, major industrial countries
such as Germany and Japan stand to experience even
sharper increases in their retirement-age population.
Such a pronounced demographic change poses many
challenges for a country’s well-being. One key concern
is how a government can support its retirement-age
population when the number of workers whose payroll
taxes fund each retiree steadily declines. In the United
States, the population aged 15 to 64 is currently more
than five times larger than the 65-and-over population.
This ratio, however, will fall to only three by 2030. The
ratio of working-age people to retirees will drop to still
lower levels in Germany and Japan.
In this edition of Current Issues, we explore the 
economic pressures that an aging population places on
the government financing of retirement benefits. Our
approach is largely conceptual: we examine how benefit
systems for retirees work and how the systems’structure
makes government finances vulnerable to an increase in
the retirement-age population. Although our chief focus
is on the difficulties facing the Social Security program
in the United States, we also consider how the corre-
sponding programs in Germany and Japan are being put
to the test.
In reviewing possible solutions to the problem of
financing retirement benefits, we find that the policy
options are limited: Governments can increase social
security taxes, decrease benefits, devote other tax rev-
enues to social security, or combine these measures in
some way. The need for such painful choices would be
eased if countries were to experience a prolonged pro-
ductivity boom that would boost wages and lighten the
tax burden on workers. We argue, however, that even in
this best-case scenario, the material well-being of both
workers and retirees would still fall short of what it
would have been without the demographic change.
The Demographic Transformation
The shift to an older population in the United States and
other industrial countries stems in part from the decline
in the total fertility rate, defined as the average number
of children born to each woman. In the United States,
the fertility rate has dropped markedly in recent
decades, from 3.5 children per woman in 1950 to 1.8 in
1975.1 The rate has since recovered slightly to 2.0, but
the drop in the fertility rate relative to the baby-boom
period after World War II is pushing up the average age
of the U.S. population. Fertility rates are even lower in
other developed countries. In Japan, the fertility rate has
dipped from 2.7 children per woman in 1950 to 1.4 today,
while in Germany the rate has fallen from 2.2 to 1.3.
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A second factor behind the demographic transforma-
tion is increased longevity. Better healthcare and
lifestyles mean that people live much longer than they
did fifty years ago. In the United States, the life
expectancy at birth was 68.9 years in 1950. By 2000, it
had moved up more than seven years to 76.5 years.
Germany experienced a somewhat larger rise, from 
67.5 years to 77.3 years, while life expectancy in Japan
has jumped from 63.9 years to 80.5 years.
In the decades ahead, lower fertility rates and longer
life expectancy will substantially alter the age profile of
these three countries. For the United States, the United
Nations projects that the percentage of the population
65 and over will rise from 12.3 percent today to 20.2 per-
cent in 2030.2 For Germany and Japan, the extent of the
upcoming demographic shift is even more remarkable.
Germany’s 65-and-over population is projected to increase
from 16.4 percent today to 27.7 percent in 2030, while
Japan’s increases from 17.2 percent to 30.0 percent.3
Economic Consequences of the Shift
As older people claim a larger share of the population,
the percentage of people who are working-age will
decline. We can use the United Nations’ estimate of the
share of the population aged 15 to 64 as a rough estimate
of the working-age share of the population in the three
countries considered here. In the United States, this
measure drops almost 5 percentage points, from 66.0
percent of the total population to 61.3 percent, between
2001 and 2030. Over the same period, the working-age
population declines 10 percentage points in Japan (from
68.1 percent to 58.1 percent) and 8 percentage points in
Germany (from 68.0 percent to 59.9 percent).
This loss in share of population has significant 
economic consequences. As the number of workers
declines relative to the number of retirees, national out-
put per person will fall. Since this measure is often used
as a gauge of living standards, we would expect to see
some slippage in a population’s material well-being.
More central to our immediate concerns, however, is
the effect of changing population shares on an economy’s
ability to support its retirees. Since workers fund retirees
through the payment of a social security payroll tax, a
decline in their relative numbers will make it increasingly
difficult to generate the revenue necessary to provide
old-age benefits.
To understand the extent of the problem, consider the
changes foreseen in the ratio of workers to retirees.
According to U.N. projections, the ratio of the share of
the population aged 15 to 64—again, a rough equivalent
for the working-age population—to the share of the
population aged 65 and over will fall from 5.4 today to
3.0 in 2030 in the United States (see chart). That is, by
2030, there will be only three people in the working-age
population for every retiree, down from more than five
people for every retiree today. Similar shifts are pro-
jected to occur in Germany (from 4.1 to 2.2) and in
Japan (from 4.0 to 1.9). Moreover, since not all those
aged 15 to 64 will be working, the ratio in 2030 actually
underestimates the burden on workers in each country.
Liabilities Created by a Pay-As-You-Go System
The original intent behind most public retirement pro-
grams was to alleviate poverty among the elderly. The
Social Security program in the United States—Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance (OASI)—and its counterparts
in Germany and Japan are largely pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) systems, which operate by collecting payroll
taxes and immediately transferring the proceeds to
retirees. A recent Bundesbank study of the German 
program called this system a “contract between genera-
tions” in which those able to work care for those who no
longer can.4
The key weakness of a PAYG system is that the first
wave of benefit recipients receive far more in benefits
than they pay in payroll taxes. In principle, the creators
of such a system could have paid the first beneficiaries
only what they put into the system plus some market
rate of return. However, providing nominal benefits to
those workers who were near retirement—or nothing at
all to those already retired—would not have seemed
practical. As a result, when the PAYG systems were
launched, current payroll tax receipts were used to pay
benefits to the first generations. This large initial trans-
fer of wealth is an implicit burden today on any PAYG
system, with the gap between what early generations of
recipients received in benefits and what they had paid
in taxes creating an immense liability for public retire-
ment programs. For example, a recent study estimated
Ratio of Working-Age Population to Population
Aged 65 and Over
Source: United Nations (2001).











2040 2030 2020 2010 2000 1990that the net transfer of U.S. Social Security funds—that
is, benefits received minus taxes paid in—was $7.9 tril-
lion (in 1997 present value dollars) for people born
before 1917 and $1.8 trillion for people born between
1918 and 1937, or a total of $9.7 trillion.5
A PAYG system can carry such a liability indefi-
nitely as long as demographics remain relatively
unchanged. However, when large-scale demographic
changes like those predicted for the United States,
Germany, and Japan take effect, the system may no
longer be able to sustain itself. In other words, when too
many people retire, supported by too few workers, a
PAYG setup can run into difficulties paying out
promised benefits from current payroll taxes.
To see how this might occur, assume that there are
four workers for each retiree in the United States and
that the average taxable wage is $40,000. If the four
workers (together with their employers) each contributed
10 percent of their payroll income to pay for social
security, then benefits equal to $16,000, or 40 percent
of average taxable payroll income, would be paid, on
average, to each retiree. If, however, a major shift in
demographics reduced the number of workers respon-
sible for paying benefits to each retiree to 2.5, then the
size of the benefit payment would fall. A 10 percent con-
tribution would pay for benefits equal to $10,000 in 
current dollars, or only 25 percent of average payroll
income. This represents a substantial 37.5 percent drop
in the average benefits received by retirees. If a country
did not want to accept such a deep cut in benefits, it
could raise payroll taxes. In this example, however, bal-
ancing the budget without reducing benefits would
require a sizable increase in the tax rate, from 10 percent
to more than 16 percent of payroll income.
In Germany and Japan, the PAYG system of financ-
ing retirement benefits is already under strain: social
security benefits now exceed social security taxes 
collected (see table). The United States collects less in
taxes and pays less in benefits (measured as a share of
GDP) than the other two countries, and its social secu-
rity revenues still cover its benefit payments. By con-
trast, Germany, and to a lesser extent Japan, are drawing
on other tax revenues to fund benefit payments.
The anticipated aging of the population will increase
the pressure on all three countries’ fiscal balances. In
the United States, the OASI Board of Trustees currently
estimates that payroll taxes will cease to cover benefit
payments starting in 2016 (Social Security Admin-
istration 2001). The difference between payroll taxes
and benefits will then continue to grow over time, with
the gap estimated to equal 1.4 percent of GDP by 2030
(see table). Over the 2000-2030 period, revenues for
OASI stay roughly the same while the rising share of
recipients pushes the payments from 3.6 percent of
GDP to 5.6 percent.6 By these calculations, in 2030,
payroll taxes will cover only three-quarters of benefits.
Although similar estimates are not available for Japan
and Germany, the social security systems in these coun-
tries will have to cope with increases in the share of the
retirement-age population larger than the increase
predicted for the United States.
Policy Choices
Concerns about existing or future gaps between payroll
tax revenues and benefit payments are prompting coun-
tries to reexamine their social security systems. The
options for change are limited:
 Increase payroll taxes by raising the rates or
increasing the upper limit of an individual’s
income that is subject to the payroll tax.
 Cut future benefits by lowering the initial ben-
efit level, reducing the yearly inflation adjust-
ment, or raising the retirement age (that is, the
age at which retirement benefits are offered).
 Use other tax revenues to pay social security
benefits.
Germany and Japan passed legislation to shore up
their public pension systems in 2001 and 2000, respec-
tively. Both countries have chosen to avoid increasing tax
rates and will instead reduce the financing gaps by lower-
ing future benefits.7This course of action may reflect the
fact that payroll taxes in Germany and Japan, at close to
20 percent (split evenly between workers and employers),
are already high, particularly in comparison with the U.S.
payroll tax rate of a little more than 10 percent. The cuts
in future benefits planned by the two countries take 
several forms: raising the retirement age, lowering the
initial level of benefits over time, and, in the case of






States Germany Japan States
Social security taxes 4.3 7.4 6.9 4.2
Social security benefits 3.6 10.6 7.8 5.6
Balance 0.7 -3.2 -0.9 -1.4
Sources: For U.S. figures, Social Security Administration (2001); for German
figures, Deutsche Bundesbank (2001, Table VII.12); for Japanese figures, IMF
(2000b, Table 11.5) and supplemental data from the authors of the IMF report. 
Note: The table reports taxes and benefits for the following programs: In the
United States, Old-Age and Survivors Insurance; in Germany, Wage and Salary
Earners’Pension Insurance Fund; in Japan, National Pension Insurance,
Employee Pension Insurance, Mutual Benefits, and various minor funds.Although Germany and Japan will rely heavily on
these cuts to reduce the pressure on government bal-
ances in the years ahead, Germany has also decided to
dedicate other taxes—specifically, an increase in its
existing value-added tax and an energy tax—to help
fund future social security benefits. In addition, to allay
concerns about the impact of reduced benefits,
Germany has begun an initiative to allocate government
revenue to subsidize personal pensions. This program—
which might be likened to a government-managed
401(k) plan—seeks to encourage individuals to create
their own pension plans and thereby to increase saving
for retirement. Germany anticipates that the current tax
revenues used to pay for these subsidies will reduce the
need for future tax revenues to supplement benefits.
In the United States, debate about social security
reform continues, and no changes to the system are
imminent. Earlier reforms, enacted through the Social
Security Amendments of 1983, stabilized the situation
for a time. Beginning in 1975, OASI benefit payments
had surpassed tax revenues, and by 1980, after more than
forty years of operation, the OASI Trust Fund had assets
of only $23 billion, equivalent to less than one-quarter of
the benefits paid out that year. To bolster the system and
accumulate assets, the 1983 amendments raised payroll
taxes and lowered benefits. As a result, total assets
increased to $214 billion in 1990 and, by the end of 2000,
to $931 billion, or 2.5 times the benefits expected to be
paid in 2001.8 In 2000 alone, the trust fund’s assets
increased by $132 billion. Continued surpluses in com-
ing years, according to the OASI Trustees’estimates, will
raise the ratio of assets to annual benefits to 4.8 in 2015.
The effects of these earlier reforms, however, will
not last. As we noted earlier, the Trustees project that
2015 will be the last year in which payroll taxes exceed
benefit payments. Although the assets accumulated in
the fund will be large enough to offset the shortfall of
social security taxes for another twenty-five years, the
fund will not be able to cover benefit payments after
2040 (see Box 1). At that point, when all the assets have
been sold, social security payments will be a third
greater than tax receipts.
The current pressure for social security reform in the
United States stems from a desire to minimize this
anticipated gap. Although a review of specific propos-
als is beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that the
United States, like Germany and Japan, will have to
increase payroll taxes, reduce benefits, or dedicate
other tax revenues to social security.
Strong Economic Growth: A Way out of the Bind?
Demographic changes are clearly taxing the social
security systems in the United States, Germany, and
Japan, but improvements in the countries’ economies
can mitigate the strain.The Trustees’ projections for the
OASI Trust Fund are based in part on specific assump-
tions about growth. If the U.S. economy performs better
than anticipated, then the challenge of covering social
security payments will be made easier. One source of
economic growth would be an increase in the number of
people working. If a greater percentage of working-age
people joined the labor force or if those aged 65 and
over chose to continue working, then the economy could
grow faster (see Box 2). For social security finances, the
increase in the number of people working would add to
the amount of payroll taxes collected.
A second spur to the economy would be rapid
labor productivity growth. If employers succeed in
increasing productivity, then wages will rise faster than
prices. Higher wage growth, in turn, means that more
money will be collected in social security taxes. Thus,
stronger than expected productivity growth should ease
the burden that the payment of social security benefits
imposes on workers and the government.
This effect is particularly pronounced when social
security systems adjust annual increases in benefits to
inflation, as in the United States and Japan, rather than
to wages, as in Germany.9 Price-adjusted benefits
ensure that as recipients age, their social security
checks will maintain their purchasing power. However,
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Box 1: U.S. Social Security Assets
U.S. policymakers continue to debate whether the
accumulated Social Security assets should be consid-
ered “real” assets. Those arguing that they are not real
emphasize that future sales of the assets will do little
to ease the pressures on government financing of
retirement benefits. Specifically, the assets—special
government bonds—will be sold back to the govern-
ment to obtain the funds necessary to pay benefits
once Social Security tax revenues fall short. To buy
these assets, however, the government must raise
money by issuing new debt, increasing taxes, or cut-
ting other spending. Thus, owning these securities
will not insulate the government from the need to pay
benefits that will increasingly exceed payroll taxes.
By contrast, if the assets were private bonds or stocks,
the government would be able to sell them without the
need to raise money elsewhere.
The counterargument is that the accumulated
OASI Trust Fund assets are real to the extent that they
have reduced the overall level of government debt. If
the surpluses are keeping debt and interest payments
on that debt lower than they would have been other-
wise, then they are putting the government in a better
position to cope with future Social Security deficits. while benefits increase in line with prices, they do not
increase as fast as they would if they were indexed to
wages. Retirees miss out on the income gains that stem
from increased productivity and that raise the standard
of living for those still working. Thus, although strong
labor productivity growth has the positive effect of
lightening the burden on the workers who fund social
security payments, it also increases the standard of liv-
ing gap between retirees and wage earners.
The OASI Trustees do not offer a sensitivity analysis for
their productivity assumption, but they do publish one for
real wage growth, which can be used as a proxy for produc-
tivity growth. The baseline forecast assumes that taxable
real wages average 1.0 percent growth in the future. Raising
that figure to 1.5 percent boosts the assets accumulated
by the OASDI Trust Funds so that they are not depleted
until 2044, instead of 2038, as in the baseline case.10
This calculation suggests that strong productivity
growth would ease the strains created by the coming
demographic change. However, such a development
would not essentially alter the adverse economic effects
that arise when a large share of the population moves
into retirement. Workers will be still worse off than they
would have been if there were no aging of the popula-
tion, because a portion of their productivity-related
wage gains will be deducted from their paychecks to
fund benefits for the growing pool of social security
recipients. And the retirees themselves will still see
downward pressure on benefits.
Conclusion
The coming demographic transformation of the United
States and other industrial countries poses significant
challenges. This article focuses on the problems that lie
ahead for social security systems in the United States,
Germany, and Japan as the number of workers available
to pay for the benefits of each retiree declines.
Countries can strengthen their social security systems
in different ways, but all approaches involve difficult
political choices. The burden of having fewer workers
supporting each retiree over time will necessitate some
combination of raising social security taxes, reducing
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Existing work and retirement patterns differ in the United
States, Germany, and Japan. Although the labor force par-
ticipation rate—the percentage of the population either
working or looking for work—is between 82 and 84 per-
cent for those aged 15 to 54 in all three countries, the rate
for older age groups is much less consistent across the
countries (see chart). For those aged 55 to 64, labor force
participation drops to 67 percent in Japan and 59 percent
in the United States. In Germany, the decline is much
larger, with only 45 percent of the population in this age
group continuing to work or to look for work. Moreover,
for the 65-and-over population, the labor force participa-
tion rate in Germany is only 3 percent, significantly lower
than the U.S. figure of 12 percent and far below Japan’s
23 percent rate.
A recent study of retirement plans across countries
(Gruber and Wise 2001) offers some explanations for this
disparity. In Germany, a generous level of retirement bene-
fits tends to discourage work after 60. Early retirement at
60 offers the typical German worker benefits equal to 
62 percent of previous earnings. In addition, workers who
become unemployed at age 57 and those deemed disabled
can also opt for the same early retirement benefits. In
Japan and the United States, by contrast, early retirement
benefits are more modest. Japanese workers who retire at
60 receive benefits equal to 52 percent of previous earn-
ings, while U.S. workers who retire at 62 receive benefits
equal to 41 percent of wages. Interestingly, Gruber and
Wise also find a strong correlation between labor force
participation and a measure of the tax and benefit penal-
ties for continuing to work past early retirement.
To offset the pressures that an aging population has
placed on the government financing of retirement bene-
fits, countries might adopt a policy of encouraging people
to work longer. The variations in work and retirement
behavior outlined here suggest that this strategy might be
particularly effective in Germany and other European
countries where older age groups currently have low labor
force participation rates.
Labor Force Participation Rates, 1999
Source: OECD (2000).
Note: The labor force participation rate is defined as the percentage of
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Box 2: Labor Force ParticipationCURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
8. See Social Security Administration (2001), Table VI.A2, for
asset data.
9. In all three countries, the initial benefit granted to new retireees is
indexed to wages.
10.The OASDI Trust Funds combine the OASI Trust Fund and the
Disability Insurance Trust Fund. The sensitivity analysis is only
available for the combined funds.
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benefits, or diverting other tax revenues to fund benefits.
The degree of pain involved in making these choices will
depend on future economic growth, which depends, in
turn, on what share of the population works and how
much more productive the workforce becomes. But while
faster growth may ease the pressures on government and
workers, it will not eliminate the difficulties of providing
for an aging population.
Notes
1. All demographic data are from the United Nations (2001).
2. The Social Security Administration (2001) offers a slightly 
more conservative projection. It assumes less of a decline in the fer-
tility rate (to 1.95 percent instead of the U.N. assumption of
1.90 percent) and a shorter life expectancy (79.7 years instead of
80.1). It also assumes more net migration (900,000 a year versus
750,000). Using these assumptions, the Social Security
Administration projects that people aged 65 and over will rise to
19.5 percent of the population by 2030.
3. For Germany, the United Nations assumes that fertility rates rise
from 1.3 today to 1.5 by 2030 and that life expectancy increases
from 78.2 years to 81.9 years. It assumes that the fertility rate in
Japan will show a similar increase and that life expectancy in that
country will rise to 86.3 years.
4. See Deutsche Bundesbank (1999), p. 15. 
5. See Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1999).
6. Forecasting over a long period is inherently risky, and it is quite
possible that the set of baseline forecasts from the Social Security
Administration used here will prove to be off target. Recognizing
this uncertainty, the Trustees calculate two alternative scenarios for
future revenues and benefits. One incorporates more optimistic
assumptions about productivity growth and demographic change;
the other, more pessimistic assumptions.
7. Information on the German system and its recent reform can be
found in Deutsche Bundesbank (1999) and IMF (2000a).
Information on the Japanese system can be found in IMF (2000b). 
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